This study is framed by a paradox that captures the condition of Jordan's agriculture and food system: Jordan has maintained a stable food supply through successive shocks, without significant consumer-facing shortages, despite being unable to produce all of its own food or achieve self-sufficiency under prevailing structural conditions and constraints. Two deep-rooted structural determinants shape the system. The first is acute water scarcity; the per capita share of renewable water does not exceed around 61 cubic metres a year, among the lowest levels in the world. The second is structural dependence on imports; Jordan imports around 97% of its cereals and 100% of its sugar and rice, along with most of its vegetable oils, red meat, and animal feed. This exposure reflects the system’s underlying structure, rather than a failure of management. The three factors that produced this stability, namely high commodity reserves, donor support mobilised in response to periods of need, and government budget allocations for subsidies, have all come under mounting pressure since 2020: first the COVID-19 pandemic, then the Russo-Ukrainian War, then the Bab-el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping crisis, and most recently the regional and international conflicts accompanied by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026. This leads to the study’s central question: for how long can these conditions be expected to hold in the years ahead? This study reframes the food question in Jordan accordingly. The focus should not be the pursuit of an out-of-reach self-sufficiency made limited by resources. The focus should be on the construction of a resilient system able to absorb shocks without breaking and to recover without deepening social or fiscal pressures, adaptable to a future of growing volatility in water, climate, geopolitics, and donor budgets. Resilience in this sense is the necessary condition for food security under resource scarcity, and the study measures it across its five established dimensions: Robustness (the capacity of systems to withstand shocks), Redundancy (the existence of backup systems and spare capacity), Resourcefulness (the capacity of systems to mobilise resources), Responsiveness (response), and Recovery. The diagnosis rests on a framework that illustrates vulnerability across four thematic areas: natural resources, trade and imports, production, and governance. The study concludes that water, together with energy, is the binding constraint; around 41% of the water supply is lost before it reaches the consumer, as recoverable physical and commercial losses. The Aqaba–Amman water desalination and conveyance project marks a shift in supply, yet it transfers part of the exposure from water to energy. Imports are both the system’s main stabiliser and its largest source of risk. Production emerges as a gateway to opportunity through high-value products rather than an instrument of self-sufficiency, while governance continues to depend on strengthening effective interministerial coordination. These areas function as a single system, in which a shock in one is transmitted to the others. Two recent episodes illustrate this dynamic: the Bab-el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping crisis generated logistical disruption at Aqaba and increased import costs; more recently, regional and international conflicts, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a global rise in oil prices, and interruptions to gas supplies from the Leviathan gas field affected a source that supplies around 60% of electricity generation. The industrial-sector review indicates that food industries are a major source of value added, comprising around 2,600 establishments, production worth approximately JD 4.5 billion, and exports of JD 926 million to 114 countries in 2025. It also identifies substantial import gaps that may offer opportunities for competitive import substitution and domestic investment. From this analysis emerge eight priority directions for decision-makers, ranked by their expected contribution to resilience rather than by sector: integrating water, energy, and agriculture decisions, beginning with the pricing of the Aqaba–Amman project and the linking of pumping times to surplus energy; deepening the institutionalisation of food security and launching a national indicator for it; upgrading the strategic reserve from a quantitative coverage measure to a logistical resilience standard; unifying the instruments of food purchasing power within a single targeting system; expanding high-value production and export-orientated import substitution; building farmers' capacities in irrigation efficiency and modern technologies; fortifying the water-energy pathway against geopolitical shocks; and an accompanying applied research agenda. These directions also align with the two pillars of the Economic Modernisation Vision 2022–2033: quality of life founded on stable and affordable food and sustainable growth founded on converting agri-food knowledge into exports and jobs.